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OVERVIEW
+
+
+
+

Definition and basics
Reality check
Implications for doctrine / enforcement
Why antitrust?
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DEFINITION

The application of empirical
behavioral findings to antitrust law
and policy
+

Examining the antitrust implications of
recognizing the bounded rationality of real
consumers, business managers, regulators,
and courts
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THE BASICS: RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS
Antitrust law aims to protect competition
among rational suppliers to satisfy the
demands of rational consumers
+

+

Familiar with respect to suppliers (e.g., Matsushita,
Brooke Group), which are assumed to be rational
profit-maximizers
While the basic consumer building block is only
occasionally noted (e.g. Brown University), with little
consideration of the significance of its rationality
assumption for antitrust
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

THE BASICS: RATIONAL CONSUMERS
The standard approach assumes a great
deal about consumers…
+ Rational consumer beliefs
+ Rational consumer preferences
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THE BASICS: RATIONAL BELIEFS
+

No systematic biases/errors of
judgment
+

No biased estimates of product quality

+

No mistaken judgments of absolute or relative
prices

+

No erroneous predictions of one’s own future
needs / preferences (demand)
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THE BASICS: RATIONAL CHOICE
+

Consistent choice behavior
+

Complete and orderly preferences

+

Standard axioms of rational choice
+

+

E.g., Transitivity, Dominance, Regularity (IIA)

Implied assumptions of rational choice
+
+
+

Description invariance
Procedure invariance
Context independence
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THE BASICS: REAL CONSUMERS…
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THE BASICS: BOUNDED RATIONALITY (BR)
+

Limited cognitive resources (Simon)

+

Judgment and decision making under
uncertainty
+

Reliance on heuristics, environmental cues

+

Impact of motivation and emotion

+

Social preferences

Systematic, predictable deviations from
(hypothetical) perfect rationality
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958
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THE BASICS: BR CONSUMERS
+
+

+

Systematic consumer bias
Constructed consumer choice
Particularly in the presence of
sophisticated sellers that exploit
consumers’ bounded rationality
+

Behavioral Industrial Organization
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THE BASICS: BR MANAGERS—FIRMS
Firms designed to maximize profits, but…
+ Human managers—agency problems
+ Limits of incentives and motivation
+ Expertise helps, to a degree
+ Intrafirm selection beyond pure competence
+

+
+

Commitment, overconfidence

“Organizational repairs” for routine tasks only
Board monitoring/guidance
+

Small group limits; managerial influence
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THE BASICS: BR MANAGERS—MARKETS
In typical antitrust settings:
+

Competitive discipline obviously
constrained…
+

+
+

And can reward some BR when operates (e.g., entry)

Arbitrage often impractical
Identifying errors and learning from them is
difficult

Hence, firms better approximate
rationality, but only imperfectly
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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REALITY CHECK:
A MORE REALISTIC ASSESSMENT AND
PREDICTION OF MARKET BEHAVIOR
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REALITY CHECK:
HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS
+

The real world is “sticky”
+

Established patterns of market behavior more stable
then standard models predict
+
+

+

+

Norms, status quo bias/loss aversion, etc.
Managerial incentives

Suboptimal collaboration (e.g., information
sharing) among rival oligopolists
Higher likelihood and stability of cartels in
some market settings
+

Much evidence from criminal enforcement
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

15

REALITY CHECK:
MARKET POWER
+

Not always fully exploited
+

+

Somewhat “sticky” market shares
+
+

+

Reputation with consumers, social norms
Particularly in consumer goods
Efficacy of rebates, loyalty programs etc.

Boundedly rational entry
+
+
+
+

Higher rates of entry than assumed
But very low success rate, limited mobility
Limited short term impact on established incumbents
But important long term source of innovation
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958
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REALITY CHECK:
MONOPOLIZATION
+

Seemingly irrational predation (e.g.,
recoupment unlikely) can be rational in fact
+

+

Investment in predatory reputation with asymmetric
information

Boundedly rational predation possible in
certain circumstances
+
+

Competition over market share / relative position
Loss averse dominant firms losing market share
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REALITY CHECK:
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
+

Interbrand: Tying, bundling
+

+

May offer somewhat more effective foreclosure in
consumer markets due to consumer inertia (status
quo bias etc.)

Intrabrand: Minimum RPM
+

Mfrs. tend to use excessively
+

+
+

Overestimate harms of price cutting, prefer to control
retail prices, and more

To their own detriment and that of discount retailers
Consumer harm only if pervasive in market or mfr.
has market power (limited substitutes)
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REALITY CHECK:
MERGERS
+

Generally
+

Many mergers fail to add value
+

+

Efficiencies often overstated
+

+

+

Agency problems, managerial hubris
Necessary to justify, desirability bias etc.

Accounting for boundedly rational entry

Horizontal
+

Coordinated effects may be underestimated
+

Cf. criminal collusion cases
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QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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IMPLICATIONS FOR DOCTRINE AND
ENFORCEMENT POLICY
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IMPLICATIONS: THE VALUE OF CASESPECIFIC EVIDENCE
+

Horizontal restraints
+

+

Monopolization
+

+

The Matsushita SJ threshold
Recoupment (Brooke Group / Weyerhauser)

Merger enforcement
+
+

Demand estimation—consumer surveys; simulations
Entry
+
+

+

Rapid entry
Future entry: sufficiency, actual history

Efficiencies skepticism
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IMPLICATIONS: (REASONABLY) SIMPLE
ANTITRUST RULES FOR A COMPLEX
BEHAVIORAL WORLD
+

Structuring RPM’s ROR
+

+
+

Recognizing the prevalence of BR RPM besides
traditional pro- and anti-competitive uses
Per se illegality/legality / unstructured ROR unjustified
Leegin factors matter (also for behavioral reasons)
+
+

Burden on P to show them or direct harm (output reduction)
D can rebut, showing RPM necessary to address harm /
undermine P’s main case
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IMPLICATIONS: SUMMARY
+

+
+

+

Greater concern for false negatives when
courts / agencies rely on rationality
assumptions to ignore factual evidence
Improving agency investigations / analysis
Tipping the scales in favor of one of the
limited number of available rules
Helping refine structured inquiries under
existing rules
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QUESTIONS SO FAR?
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Competition     Efficiency
Welfare
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WHY ANTITRUST?
REHABILITATING ANTITRUST
1.
2.

Competition still (mostly) performs
More competition is (usually) better
than its alternatives

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

WHY ANTITRUST?
COMPETITION (MOSTLY) PERFORMS (I)
+

Despite prevalent consumer bias
+

Some product markets still reasonably approximate
standard model

+

Heterogeneity in rationality can reduce market
effects of bias (when substantial minority
approximates rationality)

+

Deviations diminished where learning / incentives to
educate consumers exist
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WHY ANTITRUST?
COMPETITION (MOSTLY) PERFORMS (II)
+

Substantial fraction of approximately-rational
preferences remains
+

Within consumers
+
+

+

Across consumers
+

+

Some extant preferences
Many constructed “final” preferences depend on higherorder, more “authentic” preferences
Heterogeneity in rationality

Product-market characteristics
+
+

Repeat purchases
Complexity
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

WHY ANTITRUST?
COMPETITION (MOSTLY) BETTER
Increased competition
versus what?
diminished competition
(fewer firms w/more market power)

or
more direct regulation
of consumer choice
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

FINAL WORDS: ANTITRUST AGENDA
I. Identify market conditions that determine
effects of competition


Some markets sufficiently approximate standard model



On occasion (more) regulation may perform better



Would greater MP sometimes outperform competition?

II. Relate above market conditions to policy


Inform antitrust rules / boundaries





Tolerate dominance more in some settings? (cf.
natural monopoly)
Support deference to market-specific regulation?
Innovation and competition—less deference to IP?
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3681958

THANK YOU!

FOR MORE IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS SEE
MY AUTHOR PAGE
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